will be integrated into the rear operation plan. They will report directly to the RAOC/RTOC.
Base Defense System
To be effective, a base defense system must accomplish the four rear operations tasks. They are:
Secure the base.
Detect the enemy.
Delay the enemy.
Destroy the enemy.
Each of these components of a base defense system is discussed in detail below.
Secure the base. The base/base cluster commander must set necessary defensive measures for the
security of his unit. The base must arrange assets to secure the unit while the primary CS or CSS
mission continues. Each commander must apply METT-T to determine these requirements. The
mission must be accomplished. The base must be secure.
Detection. Detection efforts include the use of day and night observation devices as well as
infiltration attempts by the enemy. The platoon early warning system (PEWS) is an effective anti-
intrusion and detection system. However, it must be employed in sufficient quantities to provide
adequate coverage of the base area. Chemical detection and radiological monitoring devices also
Warning systems and procedures are set up to give notice of enemy attack. The procedures must
include graduated phases of defense to meet the suspected or known threat (possible, probable,
imminent). If an attack is unlikely but possible from Level I threats, the percentage of personnel
involved in the defense is quite small. If a Level II or III threat is probable, the defensive requirements
may disrupt or stop the combat support mission. The base must prepare for the attack. Alarms should
be sounded to notify all personnel of various alert postures. Devices such as sirens, pyrotechnics, and
horns can be used for this purpose. There may be areas in the rear that have no tactical units, or are
isolated because of troop disposition. They should be reconned on an irregular basis by MP patrols.
The RAOC/RTOC should coordinate this action with the echelon PM as part of the MP security mission.
Delay. The defense system must hinder the attacker's progress after detection and warning enough to
permit base defense forces to react. Delay is done by employing obstacles and possible minefields.
These obstacles are covered by direct or indirect fires. They are designed to slow and channel the
enemy movement (see Figures 6-1 and 6-2).