ANSWER: YES. PREMEDITATION MAY BE INFERRED THROUGH THE SURROUNDING
CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS THE MANNER IN WHICH THE VICTIM WAS KILLED.
PREMEDITATION CAN BE INFERRED FROM THE VICIOUSNESS OF THE ATTACK. UNITED
STATES V. MATTHEWS, 13 MJ 501 (ACMR, 1982). IN MATTHEWS, THE VICTIM WAS
STABBED 53 TIMES.
IN ANOTHER CASE, THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR
PREMEDITATED MURDER WAS UPHELD AFTER THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT THE
APPELLANT CHASED THE VICTIM UNTIL SHE WAS RENDERED UNCONSCIOUS. HE THEN
TIED HER UP, RAPED HER, AND AFTER PUTTING A TOWEL AROUND HER NECK TO
CATCH THE BLOOD, PROCEEDED TO SLIT HER THROAT. HE THEN FINISHED UP BY
STABBING HER 32 TIMES. UNITED STATES V. TEETER, 12 MJ 716 (ACMR 1981). PRIOR
ANGER AND PRIOR THREATS MADE AGAINST A VICTIM CAN ALSO BE CONSIDERED
INDICATIVE OF PREMEDITATION. UNITED STATES V. BULLOCK, 10 MJ 674 (ACMR 1981).
QUESTION: WHAT IF THE ACCUSED INTENDED TO KILL A, BUT MISSED AND KILLED B?
ANSWER: WHEN THE ACCUSED WITH A PREMEDITATED DESIGN TO KILL ATTEMPTS TO
UNLAWFULLY KILL A CERTAIN PERSON BUT, BY MISTAKE OR INADVERTENCE, KILLS
ANOTHER PERSON, THE ACCUSED IS STILL CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR A
PREMEDITATED MURDER BECAUSE THE PREMEDITATED DESIGN TO KILL IS
TRANSFERRED FROM THE INTENDED VICTIM TO THE ACTUAL VICTIM. PART IV, MCM
1984, 43(c) (2) (b). A GOOD ILLUSTRATION OF THE TRANSFERRED INTENT RULE IS THE
CASE OF UNITED STATES V. BLACK, 11 CMR 57 (CMA 1953). THE ACCUSED AND
SEVERAL OTHERS WERE IN A GROUP WHEN AN ARGUMENT ERUPTED BETWEEN BLACK
AND A SOLDIER NAMED LEWIS. AT ONE POINT THE ACCUSED TOLD LEWIS, "I HAVE
EIGHT ROUNDS FOR YOU IN MY M-1." THE ACCUSED THEN WITHDREW TO HIS BUNKER,
PROCURED THE RIFLE, AND RETURNED. AS THE ACCUSED APPROACHED LEWIS,
SOMEONE CALLED OUT "LOOK OUT, LEWIS." AS LEWIS TURNED, THE ACCUSED FIRED
ONE SHOT WHICH ENTERED LEWIS' RIGHT CHEST AND, EMERGING FROM THE REAR OF
THE LEFT CHEST, STRUCK A BYSTANDER, PVT KIRCHNER, IN THE ABDOMEN.
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SHOOTING, THE ACCUSED WENT TO PVT KIRCHNER'S SIDE
AND SAID "SORRY BUDDY, IT WAS NOT MEANT FOR YOU, IT WAS MEANT FOR LEWIS."
THE APOLOGY, HOWEVER, WAS APPARENTLY TO NO AVAIL AS BOTH LEWIS AND
KIRCHNER DIED AS A RESULT OF THEIR WOUNDS.
THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS NOTED THAT ONE WHO KILLS A PERSON IN A
MALICIOUS EFFORT TO KILL ANOTHER IS GUILTY OF MURDER. UNDER THIS RULE, THE
ACCUSED COULD BE CONVICTED OF THE PREMEDITATED MURDER OF KIRCHNER AS
WELL AS THAT OF LEWIS. U.S. V. SECHLER, 12 CMR 119 (CMA 1953).
2. Intentional Murder (Article 118(2), UCMJ). If an individual succeeds in convincing a
military judge or court panel that premeditation was lacking and that an unlawful killing occurred
spontaneously, the offense will be intentional murder. This offense is used in those instances where the
accused acted either with an intent to kill or an intent at least to inflict great bodily harm. As a general
rule, it may be inferred that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his deliberate
actions. Therefore, if a person deliberately does an act which is likely to result in death or great bodily
injury, it may be inferred that the death or great bodily harm was intended. Part IV, MCM, 1984, para
43(c) (3) (a). With intentional murder, the intent does not need to exist for any particular length of time
before the act is committed as long as it exists at the time of the killing. One example of an intentional
murder would be when the
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