situation. As such, it demands immediate entry. Michigan v. Tyler, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). In the
Clifford case, however, the arson investigators returned to the scene at 1300 hours. This was about 6
hours after the fire had been extinguished, and they had left the scene. Was the resulting search of the
home lawful? Here, the search involved the defendant's HOME. The Court noted that some fires "may
be so devastating that no reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins." This was not,
however, such a case. Part of the home had been largely undamaged by the fire, and many personal
belongings remained inside. The owners had arranged to have the home secured. "Under these
circumstances, and in light of the strong expectations of privacy associated with a home," the owners
did retain a reasonable expectation of privacy. Again, this was a personal residence, and "privacy
interests are especially strong in a private residence...At least where a homeowner has made a
reasonable effort to secure his fire-damaged home after the blaze has been extinguished and the fire
and police units have left the scene...a subsequent post-fire search must be conducted pursuant to a
warrant."
In U.S. v. Weiss, 11 MJ 651 (AFCMR, 1981), the sheriff of Hillsborough, Florida, was armed with a
court order to repossess the accused's automobile. The sheriff obtained the aid of the MacDill AFB
Security Police. As a courtesy, the sheriff's department generally allowed individuals to remove
personal items from the vehicles that were being repossessed. The accused was, therefore, allowed to
remove his possessions. When the accused subsequently departed carrying a box of personal items
that he removed from the vehicle, the security policeman saw a piece of plastic sticking out of the
console. He reached into the car, opened the console, and discovered a bag of marijuana. The
policeman testified that he thought the accused had left something of his in the vehicle, and that he was
getting it for the benefit of the accused. The court held that "the accused could have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in this situation.. title to the vehicle had passed from the accused."
In U.S. v. Repp, 23 MJ 589 (AFCMR, 1986), the court dealt with a suspect who had been
apprehended, and who had his forearms examined for needle marks. The court held that forearms
"possess no reasonable expectation of privacy. They are routinely exposed to public view." In U.S. v.
Adams, 13 MJ 818 (ACMR, 1982), the victim of a sexual assault turned on a personal tape recorder
and actually recorded the incident. The court held that the prohibition against recording a conversation
without consent, found in AR 600-20, was aimed at official activities, and "does not proscribe the
recording by an off-duty soldier in her private living quarters of what occurred during the commission of
a serious and repulsive crime against her person by an intruder." Here, the recording was done in a
purely private capacity. Further, "there certainly could be no expectation of privacy on the part of the
appellant...not only could he expect to have the victim testify against him regarding his conduct, but it
appears that during a substantial part of the time involved, the door of the room was open to a hall used
by other occupants of the building. Under these facts, the appellant could not expect what he said to
Private L during his encounter with her to have remained confidential."
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