might act as an aphrodisiac." Such facts, if true, would be a defense to criminal liability. Involuntary
intoxication, then, is a defense. The same result came in U.S. v. Mow, 22 MJ 906 (NMCMR 1986).
There, the accused argued that he had unknowingly ingested marijuana by eating some rum raisin balls.
In both cases the use of the controlled substance must be knowing. If the accused's story is believed, the
involuntary intoxication is a complete defense.
QUESTION: WHAT IF THE ACCUSED IS AN ALCOHOLIC?
ANSWER: IN U.S. V. SCHUMACHER, 11 MJ 612 (ACMR 1981), THE COURT HELD THAT THE
ACCUSED KNEW THE CONSEQUENCES OF DRINKING, AND HIS DOING SO WAS A
VOLUNTARY ACT. DRUNKENNESS IS NOT ITSELF A DEFENSE AND "THE LAW DOES NOT
DISCRIMINATE IN FAVOR OF A DRUNK." U.S. V. RIEGE, 5 MJ 938 (NCMR 1978).
QUESTION: WHAT IF THE ACCUSED THINKS HE IS CONSUMING ONE ILLEGAL DRUG AND
HE ACTUALLY CONSUMES ANOTHER; I.E., COCAINE INSTEAD OF SPEED?
ANSWER: THE ACCUSED KNEW HE WAS CONSUMING A CONTRABAND DRUG. THUS,
THIS IS NOT "INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION," AND IT IS NO DEFENSE. U.S. V. WARD, 14
MJ 950 (ACMR 1982).
The accused will have to show he was intoxicated and that his mental facilities were really impaired.
This requires more than just showing he drank a few beers. U.S. v. Deavers, 7 MJ 677 (AMCR 1979).
QUESTION: HOW DO YOU SHOW INTOXICATION?
ANSWER: HOW DID THE ACCUSED ACT AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME? DID THE ACCUSED
ENGAGE OTHERS "IN LUCID CONVERSATION?" WAS HE COGNIZANT OF EVERYTHING
HAPPENING AROUND HIM? IN ONE CASE INVOLVING ARSON, THE ACCUSED
RESPONDED TO A FIRE CHIEF'S ORDER TO DEPART HIS ROOM AND REQUIRED NO
ASSISTANCE TO DO SO. THE COURT WAS CONVINCED THAT THE ACCUSED WAS NOT
INTOXICATED. U.S. V. JOHNSON, 15 MJ 676 (AFCMR 1983). IN ANOTHER CASE, THE
ACCUSED "WAS ABLE TO CONVERSE COHERENTLY WITH THE GATE GUARDS." IN
TERMS OF THE ARSON OF AN AUTOMOBILE, HE "WAS ABLE TO MANIPULATE AND
ENTER A LOCKED CAR, EMPTY THE CONTENTS OF A GLOVE BOX, AND SET THEM ON
FIRE WITHIN THE CAR AND THEN EXIT THE VEHICLE. DISCOVERED BY THE OWNER OF
THE CAR, APPELLANT FLED AND WAS ABLE TO ELUDE HIS PURSUER FOR SEVERAL
HUNDRED YARDS."
QUESTION: WAS HE GUILTY?
ANSWER: YES. HE "WAS AWARE OF AND INTENDED THE NATURAL AND PROBABLE
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTS." U.S. V. REECE, 12 MJ 770 (ACMR 1981).
B. Insanity. The accused is not criminally liable for his actions if "at the time of the
commission of the acts constituting the offense, the accused, as a result of a severe mental disease or
defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of his or her acts." Mental
disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense (RCM 916(K) 1). This normally involves
expert testimony, since mere "aberrant behavior does not constitute
1-55
MP1019
Previous Page
