or property in a good faith effort to render immediate medical aid, to obtain information that will assist in
the rendering of such aid, or to prevent immediate or ongoing personal injury." Here, though, the
emergency was over. "There was no emergency requiring the rendition of immediate medical aid" at
the time of the search. On the contrary, "the accused's wife had been taken to the hospital, seen by
medical personnel, determined to be out of danger medically, and referred to a psychologist for
counseling. Notably absent in this case is any concern on the part of those searching for the medical
condition of the victim. Rather, what appears of record is a command desire to know what drugs were
taken for some unarticulated administrative reason rather than in aid of medical treatment. This is
confirmed by the actions of the search party once the items of contraband had been discovered. The
searchers immediately lost interest in discovering which type of pills were ingested and concentrated on
perfecting a search for evidence of crime."
As we saw earlier, a warrantless entry into a burning building was upheld as reasonable. This
situation "clearly presents an exigency." There is "compelling need for official action and no time to
secure a warrant." Michigan v. Tyler, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). In another case, a room was entered as
a result of "an emotional cry for help." Inside the room, a victim was found inside of a locker, barely
alive. The court held that this wasn't a search for evidence of a crime, but was a good faith effort to
render immediate medical aid: "It is clear the police may enter a dwelling without a warrant to render
emergency aid and assistance to a person they reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of
assistance...In applying the emergency doctrine, the question that must be answered is whether there
is evidence which would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to act." U.S. v. Mons, 14
MJ 575 (NMCMR, 1982). Such a situation is not regarded as a search for evidence of a crime, and is
not the type of situation contemplated by the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v. Lewis,
11 MJ 188 (CMA, 1981).
In another case, the provost marshal's secretary telephoned an individual's home to discuss a
traffic citation. She spoke with the accused's 9-year-old son, and learned that he was there with his 8-
year-old sister. According to the son, the parents were both at work. The secretary believed that
leaving the children alone violated a post policy, so she reported the situation. An MP was dispatched
to investigate. He considered it to be a "routine matter;" i.e., a report of unattended children. He did
not believe it to be an emergency. "He had no information or reason to believe that the children were
afraid or were threatened. He did not believe them to be in danger." He rang the doorbell and there
was no answer. He was then instructed to enter the premises, which he did. "He found no sign of a
struggle, no blood, odors or any other indication that the children had been abused, neglected, or in any
danger." Looking in the master bedroom, he discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia.
Faced with these facts, the court held that "police officials have the right and the duty to enter a
residence in an emergency situation." The key, however, is the existence of emergency or exigent
circumstances." Here, the MP had no reasonable belief that any emergency, in fact, existed. The court
concluded by stating that "if reasonable grounds exist to justify immediate action to protect or preserve
life or avoid serious injury, a dwelling may be entered without a warrant...The presence of an
emergency demands immediate action on his part and not a delay to obtain further guidance." Under
the "unique" facts of this case, however, the court could only conclude there was no emergency, so the
search was unlawful. The court explained, however, that "almost any variance from the evidence
presented" could have produced a different outcome. U.S. v. Gammon, 16 MJ 646 (AFCMR, 1983).
MP1021
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