The police may also enter a residence in the case of someone who has been shot or wounded
inside. U.S. v. Rodriquez, 8 MJ 648 (AFCMR, 1979). In Arizona v. Hicks, 40 Cr.L. 3320 (1987), the
Supreme Court dealt with the case of a suspect who fired a bullet through the floor of his apartment,
injuring someone on the floor below. The police arrived at the scene and entered the accused's
apartment. This entry was "justified by the exigent circumstances of the shooting." In another case, the
accused's daughter required surgery and the commander was led to believe that it was urgent that the
accused's wife consult with her husband. The accused (husband) was, however, on leave. Attempts to
contact him at his leave address failed, since the accused was not at the address. "Still motivated by
the overriding need to put him in contact with his wife about his daughter," the commander tried a "long
shot." Knowing that the accused had recently arrived from his prior duty station in Italy, and knowing
that the accused had been getting letters from an APO address, the commander thought there may
have been some connection between the two, and decided to look through the accused's office. Inside
of a locked credenza, a stack of letters with an APO return address was discovered. The address was
copied down and by checking with a directory, it was determined that the letters were from an
installation in England. This finally led to locating the accused. As for the search, the court held that
the emergency justified it. The commander "had a compelling duty to notify his subordinate of his
child's trouble...By not being where he led his commander to believe he would be, appellant virtually
invited his commander to look in his credenza drawer if it became necessary to contact him." The
circumstances appeared to the commander to constitute an emergency. The commander felt that
obtaining the accused's consent to the surgery, or at the very least, his advice, was imperative for the
safety of the child. The court ruled that it would not fault the commander for electing not to gamble on
the well-being of the child. U.S. v. Muniz, 23 MJ 201 (CMA, 1987). They then cited a "classic
statement" of the emergency search doctrine, one that is worth repeating here:
"A warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning home to rescue
occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or to bring emergency aid to an
injured person. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification
for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency."
e. Military necessity. Under MRE 315(g)(2), a search authorization is not required if there is "a
reasonable military operational necessity that is reasonably believed to prohibit or prevent
communication with a person empowered to grant a search warrant or authorization and there is a
reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a search warrant or search authorization would
result in the removal, destruction, or concealment of the property, or evidence sought." This exception
has not been extensively litigated.
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